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Abstract
Over the past decade the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and other
emerging power alliances (such as BASIC [Brazil, South Africa, India and China] and IBSA
[India, Brazil, South Africa]), as well as multilateral organizations in the Asia-Pacific and the
global south, have become increasingly important players on the world stage. None of the varia-
tions on Asian regionalism and emerging power alliances is in itself very influential. Taken
together, however, they are not inconsequential for the European Union (EU) and its position on
multilateralism. Their views on multilateralism differ from the EU’s vision with regard to contents
and methodology. Problematic for the EU is that their views not only structure the relations
between the emerging powers themselves, but that these powers also increasingly try to promote
them as the basic principles for structuring international relations and regimes on a global level.
Introduction
In March 2013, during the fifth BRICS summit meeting in Durban, South Africa, the
leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) launched the ‘eThekwini
Action Plan’, suggesting a further intensification and institutionalization of their
co-operation in the field of foreign policy, including within the framework of the United
Nations (BRICS, 2013). This action plan is the latest step in a development that started
in 2001, when Jim O’Neill – chief economist of Goldman Sachs – coined the acronym
‘BRIC’ in order to focus on the enormous potential of the economies of four emerging (or
re-emerging) powers: Brazil, Russia, India and China (O’Neill, 2001). Five years later,
these four countries started a process of political dialogue when their ministers of foreign
affairs met for the first time in the BRIC format in the margins of the 61st United Nations
General Assembly in New York. From mid-2008 onwards, co-operation in the BRIC
format was further strengthened by meetings of other ministers, including the ministers of
finance, agriculture and health policy. The leaders of the four powers started meeting on
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a regular basis with the first annual BRIC summit meeting being held in 2009. Another
BRIC breakthrough was made in December 2010 when Brazil, Russia, India and China
decided to grant South Africa access to their group. In early 2011, ‘BRIC’ was trans-
formed into ‘BRICS’, which increased the representativeness of the BRICS format, as it
now also includes an African emerging power.
Despite the growing importance of the BRICS, the European Union (EU) has no
genuine ‘BRICS policy’. Neither has it formulated a policy to respond to the rise and
growing influence and assertiveness of an increasing number of emerging powers and
‘emerging power alliances’ (Bava, 2011). Until recently, the BRICS countries as a group
were rarely referred to in EU documents. This changed somewhat as in late 2011 and early
2012 the European Parliament (EP) discussed this theme, leading to a report on the EU’s
foreign policy towards the BRICS and other emerging powers (European Parliament,
2012). The EU still prefers an individual approach towards these countries, including
through the development of bilateral ‘strategic partnerships’. This preference also became
clear, for example, in the intervention of Catherine Ashton – High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission
(HR/VP) – in the debate in the EP on the EU’s policy towards the BRICS and other
emerging powers (Ashton, 2012). There are some good reasons for the EU’s preference
for bilateral relations with the BRICS countries. The BRICS format is indeed character-
ized by several limitations, despite its considerable economic and political potential.
This article argues that the BRICS co-operation must be seen within the wider context
of various other emerging power alliances, such as BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India,
China) and IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) as well as other multilateral frameworks
in the Asia-Pacific region and the global south in general. Taken together, these emerging
power alliances and multilateral frameworks are increasingly influential. They present
serious challenges for Europe in particular, in view of their defiance of the international
order (in which Europe occupies privileged positions) and their different approaches
towards multilateralism.
In recent academic literature attention has been focused on EU–Asia relations (Chaban
and Holland, 2013; Christiansen et al., 2013; Hwee and Turner, 2012), EU–China rela-
tions (Holslag, 2011; Men and Balducci, 2010; Wouters et al., 2012b) and comparative
regionalism in general (Doidge, 2011; Ikenberry et al., 2012; Murray, 2010). This article
aims to fill a gap in the literature by assessing the BRICS and other emerging power
alliances within the broader context of other multilateral settings in the Asia-Pacific region
and the global south. By covering the various interrelated multilateral frameworks and
emerging power alliances, the article strengthens our understanding of the potential
challenges for the EU and its view on multilateralism.
Theoretically, the emerging power alliances and multilateral frameworks in the Asia-
Pacific region will be explained by pointing to the ‘relations-oriented’ perspective on
multilateralism, which is included in the seminal article on multilateralism by Caporaso
(1992). This perspective has to complement the more ‘rules-oriented’ perspective that is
generally emphasized in the academic literature on multilateralism and also appears in the
definition of ‘multilateralism’ provided by Ruggie (1992a, b).
The article consists of five parts. The first provides an overview of the differences and
similarities between Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The second highlights
the gradually increasing influence of the BRICS countries, using the example of the
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European financial and sovereign debt crisis. After that, the increasing influence of the
BRICS as a group is situated within the wider context of emerging power alliances and
other multilateral frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region and the global south. Making
use of the conceptualizations of ‘multilateralism’ provided by Ruggie and Caporaso, the
ensuing section analyzes these different views on multilateralism and points to the chal-
lenges for the EU and its perspective on multilateralism. The final section demonstrates
how the EU failed to use the ‘strategic partnerships’ with the emerging powers to promote
its view on multilateralism.
I. The BRICS beyond Differences: Aiming to Reform the
International Institutions
Notwithstanding the intensification of their co-operation, the BRICS differ substantially
in terms of demographic, economic, military and political weight (see Table 1) as well as
in terms of their political and economic systems and their regional and global ambitions
(Keukeleire et al., 2011; Renard and Biscop, 2012). The divergent and sometimes con-
flicting interests, as well as the territorial conflicts between China and India and between
China and Russia, call into question the potential of the BRICS dialogue and co-operation
to lead to a firm and coherent bloc.
Despite the differences, the BRICS countries also share some characteristics that
distinguish them from other (emerging) powers and bring them closer to each other
(Hurrell, 2006, pp. 1–3). First, they possess ‘a range of economic, military and political
power resources; some capacity to contribute to the production of international order,
regionally or globally; and some degree of internal cohesion and capacity of state action’
(Hurrell, 2006, p. 1). Second, they share the belief that they are entitled to a more
influential role in world affairs. Third, they all lie outside or on the margin of the
American-led set of international and multilateral structures and are not closely integrated
in an alliance system with the United States. It is this combination of factors that leads to
the willingness of the BRICS countries to strengthen their mutual relations and to promote
Table 1: The BRICS Countries: Statistical Overview
Brazil China India Russia South
Africa
Population in millions (2010) 195.2 1,359.8 1,205.6 143.6 51.5
Surface area (in 1000 sq km) 8,514 9,600 3,287 17,098 1,219
GDP in billions of current US$ (2012) 2,252.7 8,358.4 1,841.7 2,014.8 384.3
GDP/capita in current US$ (2012) 11,340 6,188 1,489 14,037 7,508
EU-27 import (goods) in millions of euros (2012) 37,254 289,902 37,328 212,882 20,525
EU-27 export (goods) in millions of euros (2012) 39,630 143,833 38,467 123,016 25,526
Permanent member UN Security Council No Yes No Yes No
Nuclear weapons No Yes Yes Yes No
Defence expenditure in millions of current US$ (2011) 36,822 90,221 36,115 51,549 5,291
Defence expenditure as percentage of GDP (2011) 1.48 1.24 1.98 2.79 1.29
Active military personnel (2012) 318,500 2,285,000 1,325,000 845,000 62,100
Sources: European Commission – DG Trade (2013); UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2013);
International Institute for Strategic Studies (2013); World Bank (2013a, 2013b).
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alternative or complementary international forums and linkages beyond the predominant
western-dominated organizations.
Theoretically, both neo-realist assumptions and globalization theories point to the logic
of the rise of the BRICS and of their intensified co-operation. On the one hand, the current
international distribution of power fosters common balancing behaviour against the
United States in an international context in which it still is the predominant power and in
which none of the BRICS countries individually is yet strong enough to counterbalance it.
On the other hand, ‘globalization and ever denser networks of transnational exchange and
communication create increasing demand for international institutions and new forms of
governance’ (Hurrell, 2006, p. 8).
Both theoretical perspectives help to explain why the BRICS countries continuously
express their joint support for reforming the United Nations and the international financial
institutions (IFIs) and for upgrading the role of the G20 (instead of the G7/8) as all the
individual BRICS countries hold membership in the G20. This aim to reform the inter-
national institutions also appeared in the eThekwini Declaration, adopted by the leaders of
the five BRICS countries during their fifth summit in 2013. In this declaration, they
reiterate their support for a ‘comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security
Council, with a view to making it more representative, effective and efficient so that it can
be more responsive to global challenges’ (BRICS, 2013). The paragraph in the eThekwini
Declaration on IFIs equally raises the issue of representation, as the BRICS leaders call
for ‘the reform of International Financial Institutions to make them more representative
and to reflect the growing weight of BRICS and other developing countries’ (BRICS,
2013).
These calls for reform reflect the willingness of the BRICS countries to counter an
‘unjust’ western-dominated multilateral world in which they are generally under-
represented (except for China and Russia in the UN Security Council). India, Brazil and
South Africa do not have the status of permanent member of the UN Security Council, in
contrast to the United Kingdom and France. The G7 only consists of western countries
(including four European countries and a representative of the EU), with Russia some-
times joining them in the G8 format. The dominance of the west and the over-
representation of Europe also appear in other multilateral settings such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (in which European countries have privileged
positions) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (in which the EU is one of the major
actors). Although the division of labour between the EU and its Member States is not
always very clear in terms of formal status and representation in many multilateral
organizations, it is clear that Europe is over-represented (see Gstöhl, 2009; Jørgensen and
Laatikainen, 2013). Together with the United States, the European countries also deter-
mined to a large extent the rules of the game in these international organizations, which
explains why the EU is in general pleased with the existing system of multilateral
governance.
II. The European Financial Crisis and the Increasing Influence of the BRICS
Five years after the launch of the co-operation within the BRICS framework, the formal
setting of the main global political forums and the UN in particular remains largely
unchanged. However, the economic power of the emerging countries proved to be stronger
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than predicted, and they have achieved some initial success in translating their economic
weight into political leverage (Keukeleire et al., 2011).
An important moment in the light of multilateralism came with the credit crunch of
2008, when the G20 – pushed forward by the BRICS – entered the global stage in
response to the financial crisis (Cherry and Dobson, 2012; Gowan, 2012). The financial
and sovereign debt crisis in Europe has also led to a fundamental shift in Europe’s
position. The eurozone crisis has been raised on the agenda of the IFIs, some European
countries have become recipients, and the EU has become dependent on non-European
countries to find solutions to its problems. Emerging powers and China in particular
proved to be significant contributors to both the global economic recovery and the
emergency measures to tackle the crises in Europe (see Chen, 2012; Della Posta and
Talani, 2011; Wang, 2011).
The financial and sovereign debt crisis in Europe had provided the perfect context for
the emerging powers (and the United States) to get decisions agreed upon during the
subsequent G20 meetings to tackle the over-representation of European states in the
international financial institutions (Wade, 2011; Allen and Smith, 2012). Although visions
on the significance of the G20 differ (Cammack, 2012; Cooper, 2010; Goodliffe and
Sberro, 2012), the emerging powers have had some success in promoting their agenda. It
was accepted in 2010 that the IMF voting system was to be reformed and that the share of
emerging and developing countries should increase from 39.4 to 44.7 per cent, with the
voting share of the developed countries decreasing by the same percentage (IMF, 2012).
The reforms of the World Bank system of voting have led to a share of 47.19 per cent for
the developing countries (World Bank, 2010). The aim of the developing countries was a
share of 50 per cent in both the IMF and World Bank, which they have not yet achieved.
The role of the BRICS in tackling the European financial crisis was illustrated by their
agreement in June 2012 to contribute to the IMF’s US$430 billion bail-out fund for the
southern European countries, as they shared the opinion that the eurozone crisis threat-
ened global economic and financial stability. The BRICS’ total contribution amounted to
US$75 billion, with China’s contribution being US$43 billion, Brazil, India and Russia
contributing US$10 billion each and South Africa contributing US$2 billion. The political
significance of this contribution was stressed in the context of the informal meeting of the
BRICS leaders ahead of the 2012 G20 summit in Mexico:
These new contributions are being made in anticipation that all the reforms agreed upon
in 2010 will be fully implemented in a timely manner, including a comprehensive reform
of voting power and reform of quota shares. (Ministry of External Affairs, India, 2012)
The BRICS countries thus connected the loans to long-delayed reforms that would give
the emerging powers a stronger voice at the IMF by boosting their voting power as
shareholders. Or as Emerson (2012, p. 1) observed: ‘The conditionality tables are turned’.
One year later, the BRICS leaders went one step further than promoting reform of the
existing Bretton Woods institutions. During their meeting in South Africa, they agreed to
establish a ‘New Development Bank’ for mobilizing resources for projects in BRICS and
other emerging economies and developing countries ‘to supplement the existing efforts of
multilateral and regional financial institutions’ (BRICS, 2013). The agreement in principle
conceals the fact that no consensus existed on fundamental issues, including the distri-
bution of the projects, the headquarters of the bank and the financial means to be injected.
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III. The Wider Picture: Other Emerging Power Alliances and
Regional Organizations
The common position and influence of the BRICS countries during the financial crisis is
one example of how, despite their substantial differences, they can find common ground
and have a significant impact on international developments. The importance of the
BRICS framework and the challenges it poses for Europe can, however, only be properly
understood if seen within the context of the growing number of increasingly influential
‘emerging power alliances’ (Bava, 2011) and other multilateral frameworks in the Asia-
Pacific region and the south in general. The BRICS format thus plays a significant role in,
but is also only one component of, what Mahbubani (2008) described as the ‘irresistible
shift of global power to the east’. More generally, it is part of a rebalancing, of a trend
where the centre of gravity is gradually and partially moving from the Euro-Atlantic to the
Asia-Pacific area and from the north (or ‘west’) to the ‘global south’ (or ‘east’).
There are good reasons to warn against premature assumptions that the Asian century
will arrive any time soon and that the EU will remain in a deep crisis. It is also important
to emphasize the remaining interdependence between Asia and Europe, which implies that
the fates and fortunes of the two regions cannot be that easily decoupled (Hwee, 2012).
Nonetheless, the various emerging power alliances and other multilateral frameworks
have one feature in common that is new for European states and EU foreign policy: they
represent a world where the EU and Europe are largely absent and considered as far away
(with the exceptions of the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Asia-Europe Meeting in
which the Europeans participate). It is a world where the Europeans are also judged much
less positively and as far less relevant than European self-perception might indicate (see
Chaban and Holland, 2013; Fioramonti, 2012; Jain and Pandey, 2010; Lucarelli and
Fioramonti, 2010).
The purpose of this section is to give an overview of the main (partially overlapping)
emerging power alliances and other multilateral settings in the Asia-Pacific region that are
centred around the BRICS countries (see Figure 1). In view of their varied membership
and their varying trajectories, objectives, instruments and levels of legitimacy, these
emerging power alliances and multilateral settings can come into competition with each
other, but can also be mutually reinforcing and complementary. The large number of
power alliances and multilateral settings, in combination with the limited length of this
article, does not allow for a separate analysis of each of them. Furthermore, the forums
included in this section are only a limited part of the more than 100 multilateral groupings
in the region (Bouchard and Peterson, 2011, p. 26). However, the descriptive overview in
this section will be followed by an analysis of their main common features (for a
comprehensive analysis of Asian regionalism, see Stubbs and Beeson, 2012).
In addition to the BRICS, the shift in the international balance of power encompasses
other power alliances that are variations on the BRICS setting, including the BASIC,
IBSA and RIC formats. The BASIC format with Brazil, South Africa, India and China was
launched in November 2009 with a Joint Strategy for the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference in Copenhagen where the four countries even-
tually sidelined the EU and negotiated a deal with the United States. This was one of the
first successes of the emerging powers in jointly translating their economic weight into
political leverage (Hallding et al., 2011). Since 2009, ministerial meetings have taken
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place quarterly on climate change and environmental issues. The trilateral IBSA Dialogue
Forum comprising India, Brazil and South Africa was formally launched in 2003. The
forum can be considered as coalition-building between southern countries, as well as
a vehicle for change in international relations and trilateral co-operation in 16
sectors including development, energy security, health policies and infrastructure (Vieira
Figure 1: Emerging Power Alliances and Other Multilateral Frameworks
European
Union
North Korea
Timor Leste
USA
APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF: ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN: Association of South East Asian Nations
ASEAN+3: ASEAN + Japan, Korea, China
ASEM: Asia-Europe Meeting
BASIC: Brazil, South Africa, India, China
BRIC: Brazil, Russia, India, China
BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
EAS: East Asia Summit 
IBSA: India, Brazil, South Africa
RIC: Russia, India, China
SAARC: South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation
SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
Countries in bold are considered by the EU as ‘strategic 
partners’
EU Member 
States
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Bangladesh
Brunei
Malaysia
Singapore
Vietnam
Indonesia
Philippines
Thailand
Cambodia
Laos
Myanmar
China
India
Australia
New Zealand Canada
Chile 
Mexico
Peru 
Papua
New Guinea
EAS
ASEAN
APEC
SAARC
Russia
Japan
South Korea
Brazil
South 
Africa
IBSA
Hong Kong
Chinese Taipei
Kazakhstan
Uzbekistan
Tajikistan
Kyrgyzstan
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Bhutan
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Afghanistan
Maldives
BASIC BRIC
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BRICS
ARF
Mongolia
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Source: Own design based on Keukeleire and Bruyninckx (2011, p. 400).
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and Alden, 2011; Flemes, 2009; Chenoy, 2010). RIC refers to trilateral dialogue between
representatives of Russia, India and China. The first meeting between the foreign minis-
ters of these countries in the RIC Trilateral Forum was held in the margins of the UN
General Assembly in 2002. In April 2012 the 11th trilateral meeting of the foreign
ministers of Russia, India and China was held. However, convening a RIC summit with
the three leaders has not yet been attempted, suggesting a lack of progress in their
co-operation.
Important, too, are the various networks that were established around ASEAN. The
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) comprises Brunei Darussalam, Cam-
bodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and
Vietnam. ASEAN’s aims include acceleration of economic growth, social progress and
cultural development as well as the promotion of regional peace and stability (Jetschke,
2012; Tang, 2012; Wunderlich, 2012). ASEAN can be considered the most advanced
attempt at regional co-operation in Asia (Cameron, 2012). The ASEAN+3 co-operation
was launched in 1997 and encompasses the ASEAN countries plus China, Japan and
Korea. These countries focus on several sectors including political-security, financial and
economic as well as socio-cultural co-operation. Important in this context are the initia-
tives of the ASEAN+3 finance ministers and the actions to design an east Asian financial
architecture (Sohn, 2011; Terada, 2012).
The East Asia Summit (EAS) is a multilateral forum for dialogue on broad economic,
political and strategic issues of common interest in east Asia and is concerned with
promoting economic prosperity, peace and stability in this region (Camroux, 2012). The
EAS includes China and India, together with several other Asian countries as well as
Australia and New Zealand. From late 2011 onwards, the membership has been extended
to 18 countries with the United States and Russia joining this forum.
Another player in the Asia-Pacific region is the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation
(APEC). Within the APEC framework co-operation takes place between 21 states in the
Asia-Pacific region, including major powers such as China, the United States and Russia
and other emerging or mid-sized powers in Asia (including the ASEAN countries as well
as Japan and Korea), the American continent (Canada, Mexico, Peru and Chile), plus
Australia and New Zealand making it, unlike ASEAN, not an exclusively Asian institution
(Bisley, 2012; Moon, 2011). Together, these countries account for approximately 40 per
cent of the world’s population, 44 per cent of world trade and 54 per cent of world gross
domestic product (GDP). APEC covers a wide range of economy-related policy fields,
including international environmental politics. The positions of the BASIC countries and
the United States in the UNFCCC summit reflected those adopted in a preceding APEC
summit and subsequently brought to the negotiations in Copenhagen (Keukeleire and
Bruyninckx, 2011).
Potentially significant, too, is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (not included in
Figure 1). The TPP is a proposed free trade agreement under negotiation since 2010 by
currently 12 countries, including Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam. The aim is to
produce a comprehensive agreement that could contribute toward taming the tangle of
preferential trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region and be a potential stepping stone
to achieving the long-term APEC goal of liberalizing trade among its member economies
(Capling and Ravenhill, 2011).
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Two other networks with a wider membership are SAARC and SCO. The South
Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) includes Afghanistan, Bangla-
desh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Nine countries, including
China and the United States, as well as the EU, have observer status. SAARC is mainly
focused on cultural, economic and technological development with co-operation in over
a dozen areas. However, regional instability and a lack of trust among its members
make SAARC a rather weak organization. In its over 25-year history it has been able
to establish a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), but this is considered a rather
poor track record, especially with direct trade between the two largest SAARC
members – India and Pakistan – being relatively small (Saez, 2011). The Shanghai
Co-operation Organization (SCO) was established in 2001. It includes Russia, China,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, with India, Pakistan, Iran and Mon-
golia having observer status and Belarus and Sri Lanka being dialogue partners (Chung,
2012; Takagi, 2012). The presence of China and Russia poses a paradox for the organi-
zation. While both countries obviously overshadow the smaller SCO members, the
organization would have troubles surviving without them (Naarajärvi, 2012). Although
both SAARC and SCO present interesting potential for co-operation and stability in the
region, this potential remains mainly theoretical given their poor performance records
so far (Renard, 2013).
Only two of the co-operation frameworks include the EU or its Member States. The
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was initiated in 1996. It is an informal process of dialogue
and co-operation comprising the 28 EU Member States, the European Commission, 19
Asian countries and the ASEAN Secretariat. After more than 15 years in operation, ASEM
has not been able to put its stamp on region-to-region relations. Instead of drawing on
global institutions as the background or fundamental principles against which the Asia-
Europe Meeting functions, it has instead duplicated to a substantial extent the agenda of
these institutions (Gilson, 2012). The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is a forum for
multilateral dialogue aiming to foster dialogue and consultation, and promote confidence-
building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. At the moment, the ARF has
27 participants including the EU. The almost two-decade history of the ARF since its
formation can be largely seen as a period of stagnation rather than of steady progress. This
stagnation primarily derives from the lack of mutual trust among participating states and
differing views about its desirable functions (Yuzawa, 2012).
The emerging power alliances and other multilateral frameworks mapped out in this
section differ in terms of scope and reach as well as in terms of coherence and impact.
However, they are all part of the gradual transformation of the global political landscape,
with the BRICS being only ‘one of the overlapping non-western formations to emerge in
the new era of bloc-building’ (Gowan, 2012, p. 167). Whereas none of them is in itself
very influential, taken together, they are not at all inconsequential for the EU and its
position on multilateralism.
IV. Different Perspectives on Multilateralism and Challenges for the EU
Before looking at the various positions on multilateralism, it is useful to recall the most
commonly used definition of the term as ‘an institutional form which co-ordinates rela-
tions among three or more states on the basis of “generalized” principles of conduct – that
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is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of action’ (Ruggie, 1992a, p.
571). In the academic literature, these principles of conduct or rules are strongly empha-
sized, leading to the observation of Bouchard and Peterson (2011, p. 10) that ‘the
importance of rules’ is one of the main dimensions stressed by all interpretations of
multilateralism. They therefore define multilateralism as ‘[t]hree or more actors engaging
in voluntary and (essentially) institutionalized international cooperation governed by
norms and principles, with rules that apply (by and large) equally to all states’ (Bouchard
and Peterson, 2011, p. 10).
The EU’s position on multilateralism mirrors strongly this emphasis on rules. The
EU’s ‘effective multilateralism’ doctrine is characterized by a preference for legally
binding commitments and powerful international regimes as the outcomes and instru-
ments of multilateral co-operation. For the EU, rules should not only cover economic
relations and policies but also other policy fields (such as the environment or social policy)
as well as the internal organization of Member States (including respect for human rights
or rule of law). Importantly, for the EU these binding rules are not seen as an assault on
national sovereignty (see Bouchard et al., 2013; Commission, 2003; Wouters et al.,
2012a).
When assessing the various emerging power alliances and multilateral frameworks in
the Asia-Pacific region, it appears that the Asian countries and emerging powers have
made ‘the choice for multilateralism’ too – just like the Europeans – but it is a choice
based on fundamentally different principles. In terms of substance, they prioritize eco-
nomic growth and development, with a reluctance to let the economy be restricted by
concerns that Europeans consider important, such as the environment, social protection or
human rights. They have a clear preference for a purely intergovernmental approach:
decision-making by consensus, absence of treaty obligations, voluntary commitments and
respect for national sovereignty (see also Narine, 2012). This is reflected in the formal
institutions of the Asian regional co-operation frameworks being much weaker than in
Europe (Qin, 2011, p. 118).
Qin refers in this context to what he labels as ‘relational governance’, which he
differentiates from ‘rule-based governance’. Relational governance emphasizes the gov-
ernance of relationships between actors; it is process-oriented, with the process being
considered as a collection of ongoing complex relations (Qin, 2011, pp. 138–9). This
difference between rules-orientation and relations-orientation is also relevant for concep-
tualizing the various perspectives on multilateralism.
The focus on a ‘rules-oriented’ perspective on multilateralism in the academic lit-
erature tends to push into the background the more ‘relations-oriented’ perspective that
was emphasized in another seminal article on multilateralism. Caporaso (1992), in his
analysis of theoretical routes to understanding multilateral activities, explores social-
communicative and institutional approaches that emphasize debate, communication,
deliberation, persuasion, argumentation and discursive legitimation within the multilat-
eral activity. The multilateral setting is then to be seen as a ‘forum’ where agents reflect,
discuss, trust and distrust, justify as well as signal moves, alter the other’s perceptions
of the world, and try to build consensus. Identifying and solving problems are possible
in this context, but are not at the heart of the multilateral activity (Caporaso, 1992, pp.
613–14). Multilateral institutions offer an environment in which socialization and learn-
ing can occur, in which continuous contacts and exchange of information serve to alter
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perceptions about both interests and the means to achieve them, and in which trust
can be increased and uncertainty about actions of others reduced (Caporaso, 1992,
pp. 625–27).
Looking at the agendas and outcomes of the various emerging power alliances and
multilateral frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region, it appears that, together, they constitute
an increasingly dense set of partially overlapping formal and informal networks on all
political, diplomatic and administrative levels. They cover an ever wider scope of policy
areas, and provide opportunities for debate, communication and deliberation – all reflect-
ing the features of relations-oriented multilateralism. Europeans often dismiss these
various forums for dialogue and co-operation as insignificant, especially in view of
their limited institutionalization, the lack of binding commitments and the often substan-
tial divergences among participating countries. However, taken together, they are not
inconsequential.
First, whereas the EU had hoped at the start of the millennium that its model of
‘effective multilateralism’ would gradually become the global standard, with the EU
becoming a core actor within this multilateral system, one decade later the EU sees the
limits of its approach, as well as the limited support for of its view on multilateralism. On
the contrary, the more relations-oriented forms of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific
region and emerging powers constellations point to the increasing attraction of alternative
forms of multilateralism. This provides an additional argument to support the caution
formulated by Bouchard and Peterson (2011, p. 11; see also Caporaso, 1992, p. 604) with
regards to overly optimistic claims that ‘today’s multilateralism is more binding, rules-
based, and demanding than past versions’.
Second, in view of the lack of trust between various Asian countries and the danger of
escalation of conflicts (see Bisley, 2012; Endo, 2012; He and Inoguchi, 2011; Yuzawa,
2012), the opportunities provided to political leaders and diplomats of these countries to
meet each other on an increasingly frequent basis can as such have a positive impact. The
various forums allow them to discuss and try to tackle the various conflicts of interests and
try to avoid an escalation of conflicts. Such an escalation would have detrimental effects
on the international stability and international economy at large, and could thus also have
an impact on Europe.
Third, the various emerging power alliances and multilateral frameworks in the Asia-
Pacific region are not only important to manage mutual relations in the region. They
increasingly inform and impact upon national policies. Even if the deliberations within
groupings such as the BRICS, BASIC or APEC do not lead to binding rules, they can
affect national policies if countries within their national policy-making processes take into
account the deliberations within these settings – for instance, when these contribute to
changing perceptions about interests and the means to achieve them (see Caporaso, 1992,
p. 625).
Fourth, as indicated above, these deliberations can have an impact on the position
adopted by these countries in international negotiation processes where the EU is con-
fronted with these ‘competing multilateralisms’. This means that, even if these delibera-
tions do not lead to the adoption of rules, they can be used to co-ordinate positions
regarding the changing of rules in international organizations in which Europeans are
over-represented (such as the IMF and World Bank) or to oppose the binding commit-
ments proposed by the EU (such as in the UNFCCC Conference in Copenhagen).
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The difference in views on multilateralism between the EU and the emerging coun-
tries is not a black-and-white issue, however. For example, a shift towards more rule-
oriented multilateralism could be observed at the Durban UNFCCC Conference in 2011
where three of the four BASIC countries – Brazil, South Africa and China – softened
their initial negative stance vis-à-vis legally binding commitments (Banerjee, 2012, p.
1780; see also below).
V. The EU’s ‘Strategic Partnerships’ and Multilateralism
The EU has not yet developed an effective policy to deal with the generally changing
balance of power in the 21st century. This is linked to the EU’s struggle to focus not
only on the main Asian power, China, but to also find a way for ‘anchoring Asia–
Europe relations’ in general (Hwee and Turner, 2012). To deal with the rise of emerging
powers, the EU has launched bilateral ‘strategic partnerships’ with ten third countries,
including the five BRICS countries (Grevi and Khandekar, 2011; Keukeleire and
Delreux, 2014, pp. 290–4; Renard, 2011; Renard and Biscop, 2012). These so-called
‘strategic partnerships’ are defined by the EU as building blocks of an effective multi-
lateral order with the UN at its apex (European Council, 2008).
In general, the formal relations with these five emerging countries follow the same
pattern, although it may be more correct to speak about ‘differentiated strategic partner-
ships’ (see overview in Sautenet, 2012). The legal bases for these partnerships are
long-term partnership and co-operation agreements, or co-operation agreements. These
agreements are mostly trade-related, but also touch upon policies that go beyond trade,
such as energy, global warming and foreign and security policy. Furthermore, annual
summits (in the case of Russia: biannual summits), ministerial meetings as well as sectoral
dialogues between EU officials and representatives of these third countries take place on
a regular basis, contributing to the establishment of institutional frameworks. However,
the strategic partnerships of the EU with Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa
have not helped to overcome the different views and interests of the EU and the emerging
powers (Renard and Biscop, 2012). Although labelled as ‘partnerships for effective
multilateralism’ (Grevi and De Vasconcelos, 2008), the EU has only to a limited extent
succeeded in using the regular dialogue and summit meetings with the various powers to
convince them of the EU’s views on effective multilateralism in general and about the
EU’s position in specific multilateral negotiations.
The example of the 2009 Copenhagen Conference on climate change was illumi-
nating in this respect. The EU had met several of its ‘strategic partners’ in the months
preceding the Conference, which had important issues on the agenda. The joint decla-
rations issued after these meetings gave the impression that the EU and its partners
could find some common ground, despite the diverging approaches. But finally, during
the Copenhagen Conference, the ‘strategic partners’ completely sidelined the EU and its
position on how to shape the future climate change regime (Hurrell and Sengupta, 2012;
Keukeleire and Bruyninckx, 2011; van Schaik and Schunz, 2012). The EU drew lessons
from the experience in Copenhagen and recognized that it can only promote its ambi-
tious objectives if it also takes into account the views of its strategic partners. At
the 2011 Durban Conference, the EU moderated its ambitions, found a new role
for itself as a bridge builder, and saw Brazil, China and South Africa moving in its
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direction. The Durban meeting also showed cracks appearing in the BASIC group,
indicating that the coherence of the emerging powers should not be overemphasized
(Banerjee, 2012; Groen et al., 2012).
Nonetheless, the surprise of the Europeans about their isolated position during the
Copenhagen Conference pointed to a major flaw in the EU’s approach towards the
emerging powers and the ‘strategic partnerships’. The Europeans have to listen genu-
inely, to fully understand and appreciate the positions, principles and interests of the
partners, and to take them seriously in the subsequent multilateral and bilateral nego-
tiations. The EU and its Member States are starting to learn that the diffusion of inter-
national norms has become a two-way process (Pu, 2012) and that Europe will have to
be more ready to accept ‘difference’ instead of seeing the European model and prefer-
ences as generalizable to the rest of the world (see Acharya and Buzan, 2010;
Chakrabarty, 2007; Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004; Tickner and Blaney, 2012). This is
necessary in view of a new 21st-century order that accommodates the emerging powers
and is sensitive to the needs of the global south (Howorth, 2010). The challenge for
future generations of Europeans, including European scholars, is not merely to better
know and understand Asia (Wang, 2012), but also the various forms of multilateralism
in the Asia-Pacific region and the global south.
Conclusions
This article has analyzed the BRICS and other emerging power alliances and multilat-
eral frameworks in the Asia-Pacific as well as the challenges they pose for the EU and
for its view on multilateralism. The differences between the emerging powers raise
doubts about the likelihood of the BRICS framework being transformed into a firm and
coherent bloc. However, what unites these countries is the willingness to transform
the predominantly western-dominated international organizations, inherited from a 20th-
century context, in which Europe is over-represented (in the UN Security Council,
G7/8, IMF and World Bank). The rise and potential of the BRICS needs to be situated
in the context of other partially overlapping emerging powers alliances as well as mul-
tilateral organizations in the Asia-Pacific region. Together, they contribute to and are
part of a global power shift from the Euro-Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific area and from the
north to the east and ‘global south’.
None of the variations on Asian regionalism and emerging powers alliances is in
itself very influential. However, taken together, they have an impact on the EU and the
European view on multilateralism, particularly as their choice for multilateralism differs
from the EU’s choice in terms of content (with a prioritization of economic develop-
ment) and methodology (with an emphasis on national sovereignty and a reluctance
to accept binding commitments). Referring to the conceptualizations provided by
Ruggie, Caporaso and Qin, a differentiation can also be made between a ‘rules-oriented
multilateralism’ promoted by the EU (prioritizing the creation of binding rules to pursue
policy goals) and a ‘relations-oriented multilateralism’ which focuses on relations and
interactions between the actors as the core of the multilateral activities in the Asia-
Pacific region.
To deal with the rise of emerging powers the EU has launched various ‘strategic
partnerships’ with these countries. However, the EU has not been able to use these
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partnerships to promote its view on effective multilateralism. More generally, the EU has
not yet developed a policy to deal with the generally changing balance of power in the 21st
century – a phenomenon in which the emergence of the BRICS and other power alliances
and multilateral networks needs to be situated.
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